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Invited Debate: Comment 
The Trouble With Interpreting Statistically 
Nonsignificant Effect Sizes in Single-Study Investigations 
 
             Joel R. Levin                                      Daniel H. Robinson 
                                   University of Arizona                            University of Texas at Austin 
                
 
In this commentary, we offer a perspective on the problem of authors reporting and interpreting effect sizes in 
the absence of formal statistical tests of their chanceness . The perspective reinforces our previous distinction 
between single -study investigations and multiple -study syntheses. 
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Introduction 
 
Yes, everybody has troubles, and not just with 
trivials (Sawilowsky, 2003). We adopt a different 
perspective on the Sawilowsky vs. Roberts-
Henson debates about appropriate methodologies 
for, and interpretations of, their respective Monte 
Carlo investigations (Roberts & Henson, 2002; 
Sawilowsky & Yoon, 2002). 
Although we have decided biases 
concerning the rights and wrongs of that particular 
debate, we also have decided not to jump into the 
fray for two related reasons: (1) Knapp (2003) 
considers a number of general issues that need to 
be considered in the context of Monte Carlo 
simulation studies; and (2) because we regard such 
issues more as background to certain more 
fundamental research-related effect-size-reporting 
foreground issues, we elected to forego additional 
hammering on the former so that we might nail 
down the latter. 
 
Single-Study Investigations vs Multiple-Study 
Syntheses 
The major argument promoted here is one 
that we have presented elsewhere (e.g., Levin, 
1998; Levin & Robinson, 2000; see also 
Onwuegbuzie   &   Levin,   2003). It  can  be sum- 
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marized as follows: Research conductors and 
consumers need to be more attentive to the 
different purposes/functions of an educational 
research article. Is it: (a) to report the results of an 
individual empirical study (a single-study 
investigation) or is it ( b) to summarize a set of 
empirical studies (a meta -analytic multiple-study 
synthesis)? 
 If a, then we contend that hypothesis 
testing should be a critical precursor to effect-size 
estimation in telling the researcher’s story; 
whereas if b, then effect-size reporting should play 
a more prominent role. In that context, a critical 
point of contention concerns whether the effect 
sizes associated with a single -study investigation 
should be interpreted in the absence of statistical 
significance. We have cast our nay votes on (and 
justifications for) this issue elsewhere (e.g., Levin, 
1993; Levin & Robinson, 1999; Robinson & 
Levin, 1997; Robinson, Funk, Halbur, & O’Ryan, 
in press; Wainer & Robinson, in press) and will 
summarize our stance here. 
Almost without exception, introductory 
statistics textbooks present examples based on 
single -study investigations. And, of course, a good 
number of single-study investigations are 
published in educational-research scholarly 
journals. Authors are forced to interpret the results 
of statistical inference tests – and this is where 
most of the troubles begin. In our previous 
writings, we have argued that statistical 
significance should serve a gatekeeper function to 
screen out effects whose direction has not been 
determined probabilistically. What may appear to 
be an interesting or important effect worth talking 
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about can easily be a chance finding, or one that is 
attributable solely to sampling error. In that case, 
by screening out spurious effects through a formal 
statistical test, an author protects the reader from 
erroneously interpreting the effects as if they were 
real. 
Let us insert an important comment that 
has rarely been mentioned in relation to the so-
called “significance-testing controversy.” It is 
simply that under the truth of the null hypothesis, 
testing the hypothesis that, say, two population 
means are equal or that the correlation between 
two variables is zero is equivalent to testing the 
hypothesis that the effect size is equal to zero. This 
may be readily appreciated when inferences about 
correlation coefficients are desired (because the 
correlation coefficient itself is an effect-size 
measure), though not as readily appreciated in the 
mean-difference situation. 
Yet, it becomes apparent when one 
realizes that if the two population means are equal, 
then :1 - :2 = 0, and the corresponding population 
Cohen’s d effect-size measure is 0/F = 0. Thus, if 
a researcher applies a formal statistical test and 
then proceeds to report/interpret the sample effect 
size regardless of the test’s outcome, the question 
arises: What function did the statistical test serve, 
and why was it even conducted in the first place? 
That conclusion coherence issue (Levin & 
Robinson, 2000) is one that Roberts and Henson 
(2003) need to reconcile. 
 
Another Troubling, Yet Telling, Hypothetical 
Example 
As a sequel to a perplexing example 
(Levin & Robinson, 2000, p. 34-35; see also 
Levin’s, 1993, p. 379), let us consider an 
instructional intervention study with n = 2 
participants in each of two conditions, where 
Condition 1’s scores are both 5 and Condition 2’s 
scores are both 6. For this example, a 
nondirectional permutation test would indicate that 
there is not sufficient evidence to conclude that the 
two populations are statistically different (p = 2/6 
= .333, which far exceeds the conventional .05 
level of statistical significance). 
On the other hand, if an effect-size 
measure were computed and reported, it would 
likely be communicated as gigantic  or even 
infinitely large, for in fact, in this particular 
instance d is equal to 4. Alternatively, with effect 
size defined as a squared point-biserial correlation 
coefficient, one would conclude that there is 
perfect prediction of scores from knowledge of 
condition, with no score variability left to be 
explained, for r2 turns out to be 1.00 here. Never 
mind that the study included only a couple 
participants per condition and that a valid 
statistical test performed on these data indicates a 
nonsurprising event associated with an outcome 
this or more extreme (i.e., p = .333), assuming that 
the population-identity hypothesis is true. 
Moreover, even if each condition were to include a 
third participant (resulting in n = 3) who produced 
the same scores of 5 and 6 for Conditions 1 and 2, 
respectively, the associated significance 
probability would be only p = 2/20 = .10, still 
above the conventional .05 level. 
Although this particular example may 
sound extreme, far fetched, or even ridiculous, 
consider the myriad experiments in the educational 
research literature that involve a comparison of 
two different instructional approaches each based 
on three teachers, classrooms, or schools. With 
those teachers/classrooms/schools representing the 
appropriate data-analysis units (e.g., Levin & 
O’Donnell, 1999) and with the aggregated data 
equal to the values just described, the above 
significance probability of .10 applies. 
This example also serves to clarify an oft-
made argument that statistically nonsignificant 
effects are invariably associated with small or 
trivial effect sizes. Yes, a large-scale study (e.g., N 
= 100) with trivial effects (e.g., d = .10) can 
produce nonsignificant results, but so can a very 
small-scale study with huge effects (as was just 
illustrated). Conscientious conclusion-coherent 
researchers should refrain from interpreting such 
effects as either real (in both cases) or important 
(in the second case). 
Our example leads to consideration of a 
converse situation as well, which was earlier 
discussed by Robinson and Levin (1997). The 
following question is regularly posed by one of us 
on Ph.D. qualifying examinations: “What is wrong 
with a researcher’s claim that ‘although the 
anticipated outcome did not quite reach statistical 
significance in this study, it would have if only a 
few more participants had been included’?” This 
claim is reminiscent of the substance of 
Thompson’s (e.g., 1989, 1996) proposed “what if” 
analyses and something toward which Roberts and 
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Henson (2003) tread dangerously close. (We are 
also troubled by the researcher’s use of the term 
“quite” in the qualifying-examination question, as 
will be reflected in our concluding paragraph.) 
Thus, in our above amended example based on n = 
3 participants per condition (for which p = .10), 
can it be claimed that if only one more participant 
were added to each condition the difference 
between conditions would have been statistically 
significant (since with n = 4, p = 2/70 = .029 
according to a two-sample permutation test)? 
Well, could it? 
Only if you are willing also to add that the 
outcome produced by the two additional scores 
(resulting in n = 4 participants per condition) 
mimicked exactly what was present in the original 
data. In the case of a two-sample permutation test, 
just as all three Condition 2 participants had higher 
scores than all three Condition 1 participants in the 
actually conducted study, only if the additional 
participant in each condition maintained that 
situation would there be a statistically significant 
difference at the .05 level. In contrast, if either the 
additional Condition 1 participant were to score 
higher than any Condition 2 participant or the 
additional Condition 2 participant were to score 
lower than any Condition 1 participant, then p < 
.05 statistical significance would not be attained 
(see, for example, Fisher, 1960, pp. 11-15). 
The key to answering the qualifying-
examination question is recognizing that one 
cannot simply assume that the mean difference or 
pattern will stay exactly the same with the addition 
of a few more participants. That is precisely the 
reason why one needs to collect actual data and 
conduct the analysis, rather than sitting around 
thinking in hypothetical “what if?” terms. 
Robinson, Fouladi, Williams, and Bera (2002) 
provide empirical data bearing on “what if” 
pondering and Hoenig and Heisey (2001) discuss 
an equally troubling related issue, post hoc or  
observed power analyses. 
But we have other fish to fry. In Roberts 
and Henson’s (2003) concluding paragraph, it is 
implied that researchers would be unable either to 
conduct replication studies or to perform meta-
analyses unless authors calculate and report all 
effect sizes – including statistically nonsignificant 
ones. Let us consider each of the two implied 
components (replication studies and meta-
analyses) of this contention in turn. 
Is Effect-Size Information A Necessity For 
Independent Replication Studies? 
First, the replication component. If a 
researcher chooses to replicate an experiment, 
knowledge of the specific magnitude of a 
nonsignificant outcome from that experiment is 
not a prerequisite. The forefather of experimental 
design and statistical hypothesis testing, Sir 
Ronald Fisher, certainly could  – and did – 
replicate his agricultural experiments without 
betting the farm on a single study’s effect sizes. 
Indeed, Fisher believed that the direction of an 
effect was only established if he could produce 
consistent results based on several replications. 
As investigators who have collected our 
share of primary research data, our replication 
philosophy is similar to Fisher’s. And the 
difference between that philosophy and the one 
apparently held by Roberts and Henson basically 
comes down to the difference between the 
publication of single-shot (one-experiment) studies 
(their conception of published educational 
research) and multiple -experiment replication-and-
extension studies (our conception). In fact, we 
contend that much of the fury that characterizes 
the debates between those who wish to do away 
with statistical hypothesis testing and those who 
defend the essence of it (see, for example, Harlow, 
Mulaik, & Steiger, 1997) would dissipate if 
researchers refrained from publishing and 
interpreting single -shot studies. 
Results that are statistically significant 
permit two conclusions. First, they provide 
evidence that the hypothesis under test (of which 
the null hypothesis is a special case) is not 
supported. Second, and less trivially (e.g., Cohen, 
1994), they provide evidence of the direction of 
the difference or relationship. For example, a 
statistically significant t-test comparing the mean 
scores of a treatment and control group tells us 
that it is likely that the treatment group 
outperformed the control group in the sampled-
from populations. Results that are not statistically 
significant do not permit either of these 
conclusions. 
On the other hand, it is also possible that 
certain statistically nonsignificant effects are real 
but too small or fragile to be detected within the 
parameters of the initial study. In that case, the 
researcher must decide whether or not the effect is 
worth pursuing. If so, a replication study is in 
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order, which may involve changing/tweaking one 
or more of the initial study’s features to make the 
statistical test of the treatment effect more 
sensitive – such as by incorporating a larger, more 
homogeneous, or differently defined sample, 
strengthening the treatment and/or its 
implementation, modifying the experimental 
design and analysis in some way (e.g., through 
blocking or by including a relevant antecedent 
variable in the analysis), or improving the 
psychometric properties of the outcome measure. 
If the replication study finds the effect to be 
statistically significant, and if that replication is 
followed by additional successful replications, 
then the initially spurned statistically 
nonsignificant effect will be resurrected. 
 
Is Explicit Effect-Size Reporting A Necessity For 
Meta-Analytic Literature Syntheses? 
Roberts and Henson (2003, p. 226- 230) 
argue (again, at least implicitly) that if multiple -
study syntheses are to be conducted, then reporting 
effect sizes for each experiment allows a meta-
analyst to compute an average effect size, as well 
as to see how the size of the effect may vary as a 
function of design changes. The argument has 
been made that single -study investigations should 
always include effect sizes, even for statistically 
nonsignificant outcomes, so that meta-analysts 
will be able to ply their trade using that study’s 
effect-size estimate. What is ignored in this 
argument is that a meta-analyst does not need the 
primary researcher to provide explicit effect-size 
information. As long as the researcher provides 
sufficient statistics (in the form of either means, 
variances/covariances, and sample sizes or the 
associated test statistics) then a competent meta-
analyst will be able to calculate the standardized 
effect-size measures required for multiple -study 
syntheses (see, for example, Robinson & Levin, 
1997). 
It is important to note here that we also 
differ from Roberts and Henson (2003, p. 227-
230) in our view of whether research syntheses 
should consist mostly of meta-analyses or of 
programmatic replication-and-extension studies. 
We opt mainly for the latter. We do not disagree 
that meta-analysis, as conceived by Gene Glass 
(1976) more than a generation ago, holds great 
potential for revealing potentially important 
findings that are shrouded in a literature where 
studies are classified only in terms of significant 
and nonsignificant (see also Hunt, 1997). 
However, much of what we have witnessed as 
passing for meta-analyses in the educational and 
psychological literature since Glass coined the 
term may be more masking than revealing. For 
example, certain meta-analytic studies consider all 
the research on, say, visual aids in learning from 
text (Robinson, 2002) or phonics/phonemic 
instruction in beginning reading (Ehri, Nunes, 
Willows, Schuster, Yaghoub-Zadeh, & Shanahan, 
2001) without attending to the type and quality of 
the materials or the specifics of the instruction. 
Reporting the average effect sizes in such global 
meta-analyses may inadvertently misinform the 
reader. 
Finally, we believe that there is another 
plausible meta-analytic reason to favor single -
study authors reporting sufficient summary data 
rather than the effect-size measures that can be 
derived from them. It is because (at least in our 
experience) that it is not unusual for authors to 
derive effect-size measures incorrectly – in the 
case of d, often with respect to the particular 
standard deviation selected for the specific design 
(e.g., between-subjects, within-subjects, 
ANCOVA) or question being asked, and in the 
case of r2, by not distinguishing between (or 
confusing) unconditional and conditional 
proportions of variance explained (see, for 
example, Olejnik & Algina, 2000). 
This could easily lead an incautious, or 
unchecking, meta-analyst down the wrong 
estimation path. Meta-analysts are generally more 
skilled in the nuances of effect-size types and 
variations and are less prone to calculating effect 
sizes incorrectly. Therefore, might it not even be a 
more judicious research practice/recommendation 
that meta-analysts routinely calculate effect sizes 
themselves based on a researcher’s provided 
summary statistics? 
 
Conclusion 
 
In summary, and in contrast to Roberts and 
Henson’s (2003) research philosophy, we argue 
that in the context of single -study investigations 
statistically nonsignificant effect sizes should not 
be reported or interpreted. That is because such 
reporting/interpreting may lead readers to believe 
– unwarrantedly – that evidence has been provided 
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concerning the direction of the effect. Reporting 
and interpreting effect sizes (with corresponding 
confidence intervals) in multiple -experiment 
studies where the effect of interest is replicated 
(i.e., its direction is confirmed) may provide 
readers with more useful information concerning 
the believability and magnitude of the effect, along 
with the consistency with which it can be 
produced. Additionally, when a multiple -
experiment study is programmatic  in nature (i.e., 
where the design is cumulatively extended to 
estimate the effect under differing contextual and 
procedural variations), then reporting effect sizes 
may be helpful in pinpointing the conditions under 
which the effect is strongest.  
We hope that editors of educational 
research journals will encourage authors to report 
work consisting of multiple -experiment studies 
that replicate and extend initial findings. This is 
routine procedure in many behavioral science 
disciplines; and as a clear illustration of editorially 
practicing what we are preaching, see Levin 
(1991, p. 5-6). For each experiment conducted, a 
priori " levels, a posteriori p-values, sample-size 
and power information, and sufficient statistics 
should be reported. 
In terms of summarizing the multiple 
experiments, an author may wish to quantify 
replicated effects, if that serves to inform 
practitioners who are considering adopting the 
intervention. At the same time, we are not so naive 
as to believe that a journal-policy change of this 
kind will happen overnight. Thus, until the 
practice of publishing single -shot, non-replicated 
findings changes, at least we hope that statistically 
nonsignificant results will be regarded as evidence 
that the direction of an effect of interest remains 
undetermined and further research is needed 
before a more definitive conclusion can be made. 
Single-study investigators should not routinely 
provide effect-size estimates for statistically 
nonsignificant outcomes. 
Multiple-study synthesizers can capture 
those effect sizes from the sufficient statistics 
reported. Finally, single -study authors should not 
persist in interpreting or promoting a statistically 
nonsignificant effect (which includes use of the 
terms “not quite significant,” “almost significant,” 
or “approaching significance”), due to the risk of 
consumers regarding the effect as having been 
formally screened as believable  – when, in fact, no 
formal evidence to that effect has been provided. 
With editorial changes such as these, we strongly 
suspect that many of educational research’s 
analysis-and-reporting troubles would simply burst 
like bubbles! 
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